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Abstract
The objective of this study is to examine how the information processing of news users happens
on social media in the context of spreading fake news. This study is intended to shed light on
how fake news spreads on social media with the effects of two moderators (i.e., partisanship and
source credibility) from political attitude consistency to message credibility and the effect of
mediation (i.e., cognitive appraisal to threat) from message credibility to intent to share fake
news on social media and corrective action. As a theoretical lens, dual-process theories were
adopted in this paper. For this, a 2 (news topic: Immigration vs. Gun control) X 2 (news topic
stance: Positive vs. Negative) X 2 (source: major (i.e., Associated Press) vs. minor (i.e., blog
news) between-subject online experiment with 507 participants was conducted for both
immigration and gun control topics. As a result, in the moderation effects, although partisanship
was significant for both topic immigration and gun control news, source credibility was
significant only for immigration news. Plus, the mediation effect of the cognitive appraisal to
threats was significant between message credibility and the intent to share fake news on social
media for both news topics. Lastly, even though the relations between message credibility and
corrective action had to be negatively associated, they were positively correlated.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Is fake news the second advent of The War of the Worlds? This was a radio program
broadcast by CBS in the 1930s of Orson Welles’ adaptation of the science fiction novel by H. G.
Wells about Martians invading Earth. Although CBS described that it was a science fiction
drama rather than a real situation several times before and after the radio show and in the
intermission, its airing had a tremendous social impact. Many people believed this fake radio
news was actually real news. Those who listened to the broadcast were in a panic, and injuries
and material damage followed in the process. CBS publicly apologized, and the U.S. Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) banned the use of press coverage in the airplay.
The participation of news viewers in news events has been growing through sharing via
current social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter (Oeldorf-Hirsch & Sundar, 2015).
Three-quarters of online news users have had news website content shared with them via social
media (Purcell et al., 2010). Even though two-thirds of internet users use social media (Purcell et
al., 2010), the internet still tends to provide greater opportunity for them to obtain information
that is associated with already existing beliefs whereas, in the opposite case, they are neglected
to encounter news that is different from their existing opinion. (Bimber & Davis, 2003).
On social media, the influence of fake news is gaining strength. Silverman (2016) in
BuzzFeed News analyzed the share, response, and comment counts on Facebook's 20 most
popular fake news stories for three months prior to the November 2016 US presidential election.
The research determined that fake news figures (8.70 million) secured a higher proportion of
reactions than articles featured in major media (7.33 million) such as The New York Times.
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Strikingly, the problem is that online news users on social media share fake news on their
own. The false information that fake news represents is far more rapid, invasive, and widespread
than the truth from all other information types, and the impact of false political news is more
influential than other false news like natural disasters, scientific stories, or financial information
(Vosoughi et al., 2018). Indeed, social media users on Facebook have shared the most popular
fake news stories more widely than the most popular mainstream news during the 2016 US
presidential Election (Silverman, 2016). Furthermore, many people who read fake news tend to
believe that it is true (Silverman & Singer-Vine, 2016).
Notably, during the 2016 US Presidential Election, a number of fake news articles about
the presidential candidates prevailed. Among them, the“Pizzagate conspiracy theory” (Wikipedia
contributors, 2020) caused enormous repercussions on social media and in real life as well.
Pizzagate grew from the proliferation of malicious rumors that Democratic presidential candidate
Hillary Clinton and her campaign manager, John Podesta, engaged in child sex abuse in the
cellar of a pizza shop. This rumor was picked up by fake news websites and spread via social
media, particularly through anonymous Twitter accounts and various internet communities
(Wikipedia contributors, 2020). The significance of the incident was that it drove a subscriber to
gun violence. Indeed, this may be one of the first cases of fake news developing into a criminal
offense. The series of events surrounding the Pizzagate serve as evidence that certain individuals
may be sufficiently suggestible to be influenced by fake news, and that crucial knowledge based
on the existing confirmation bias that individuals have can eventually trigger specific actions in
real life.
Despite the rise of fake news research, the academic concept of fake news still remains
far from fully defined. In other words, it is difficult to define or figure out ‘what fake news is.’
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Relatively little ‘experimental’ research has been carried out about how fake news spreads out on
social media. Lastly, little attention was paid to a psychological explanation in the context of
‘dual-process’ to provide empirical evidence on how fake news spreads on social media. Given
these considerations, this study attempts to help reduce these research gaps.
Therefore, the purpose of this experimental study is to explore how news users
cognitively process fake news on social media when they decide to share it. This research will
shed light on the relationships among partisanship, credibility (i.e., message credibility and
source credibility), cognitive appraisal to threat, intent to share fake news on social media, and
corrective action. In addition, to explain this phenomenon, these concepts will be examined as
key dependent variables. The theoretical lens of dual-process theories (i.e., the Elaboration
Likelihood Model and the Heuristic-Systematic Model) will be used to examine these
relationships.

Research Question
In order to examine these relationships, the following general research question is proposed:
RQ: How is the news users’ information processing based on partisanship in the context
of spreading fake news on social media?
Chapter 2 will investigate the relationship among fake news, partisanship-based political
attitude consistency, credibility, dual-process, cognitive appraisal to threat, intent to share fake
news, and corrective action. Chapter 3 will discuss the methodological approaches to data
collection, analysis of this data, Chapter 4 will ultimately draw results with quantitative methods.
Chapter 5 will deal with discussion, limitations, and future research.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review

Fake News
The narratives and formats used to present fake news not only appear realistic but, to
some extent, do indeed reflect reality. Fake news has been at the center of scholarly discussion
since the 2016 Presidential Election. Despite this, it is somewhat surprising that the concept of
Fake was not explicated until very recently. According to Pennycook et al. (2017), fake news
relates to the articles that are created and advertised on social media to deceive newsreaders in
order to gain ideological or financial benefits. Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) further defined fake
news as news articles that can potentially mislead readers through intentional but verifiable
falsities. In order to conduct an experimental study with the exact definition of fake, they
extracted six cousins of fake news:
First, unintentional reporting mistakes. Secondly, rumors that do not come from
particular news articles. Third, conspiracy theories. Fourth, a satire that is unlikely to be
misconstrued as factual. Fifth, false statements by politicians. Lastly, reports that are
slanted or misleading but not outright false. (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017, p.5).
Generally, fake news has received criticism from the normative and ethical point of view.
From the normative perspective of journalism, Borden and Tew (2017) suggest that there are
journalistic problems with fake news because of the expectations of news with respect to
‘gatekeeping,’ ‘factuality,’ and ‘objectivity.’ First, in terms of the gatekeeping of information
providers, journalism has an obligation to deliver important and intellectual information to news
audiences rather than to convey entertainment, gossip, or simply subjective opinions toward
particular issues. Second, as Lim (2017) pointed out, news articles without fact-checking, such as
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fake news, allow, encourage, and neglect to provide the truth with deceptive claims and political
deception. Finally, as regards journalistic accountability, fake news violates self-regulation and
moral consensus. That is to say that fake news fails to perform the appropriate role of journalistic
autonomy.
One of the principal problems of fake news pertains to the idea that it can make readers
inadvertently believe false information. Such perception becomes particularly dangerous when
this false information leads people to utilize this information as though it were fact. In fact,
previous studies (Bamas, 2012; Polgae, 2012) show that perceptions of viewers toward particular
candidates can be shaped with exposure to fake news during an election campaign. In line with
this idea, Polage (2012) claims that exposure to misleading information can significantly affect
the perceived truthfulness and plausibility of particular information. Also, Polage (2012) notes
that familiarity plays a critical role in forming judgments towards the validity of statements.
Interestingly, Balmas (2014) argues that later exposure to authentic news, which will be used as
an antonym of fake news, can subdue the impact of fake news. The study implies that exposure
to fake news can be influenced by perceiving not real issues as real.

Political Attitude Consistency based on Partisanship
People are psychologically more likely to pursue particular viewpoints and information to
support their pre-existing standpoints (Festinger, 1957). That is, cognitive efforts are made to
avoid cognitive dissonance. Festinger called it “cognitive consistency.” Confirmation bias is a
good explanation of this cognitive consistency. Confirmation bias is the tendency to acquire or
process new information by confirming preconceptions and avoiding inconsistencies with
existing attitudes, beliefs, knowledge, memories, and experiences (Allahverdyan & Galstyan,

6
2014). McRaney (2012) pointed out that confirmation bias occurs when you perceive the world
and selectively think through the filter. Nikerson’s work (1998) is to help to understand the
relationship of “determined information from seeking and interpretation” with personal beliefs or
attitudes. In addition, other relevant research studies (Brannon et al., 2007) set out to examine the
selective exposure effects regarding what is most likely strongly held attitudes and beliefs. For
example, it was determined that people prefer to gather information that is consistent with the
social stereotypes they already hold (Johnston, 1996) or which help them to retain a positive
view of the self (Holton & Pyszczynski, 1989). Also relevant is a study by Jonas et al. (2003) in
which they found selective exposure when participants made decisions concerning a current realworld controversial issue (e.g., national health policy).
Confirmation bias has its roots in psychology and offers a broad range of definitions,
depending on the context in which it is being employed (Nikerson, 1998). The use of this
concept is highly situation-dependent (Klayman, 1995). It is for this reason that some researchers
have questioned how confirmation bias explains real-world decision making (Jonas et al., 2001).
However, it is evident that confirmation bias influences people to believe their personal data,
such as experience, knowledge, and memory, in order to confirm their prior beliefs and
expectations (Klayman, 1995; Nikerson, 1998).
In reference to the discussion above, in the context of a political point of view, since
partisanship is psychologically motivated to process information that is similar to individual’s
beliefs, such individuals are apt to expose themselves to information that supports their existing
viewpoints (Stroud, 2008, 2010). According to previous research (Knobloch-Westerwick et al.,
2015; Knobloch-Westerwick & Kleinman, 2012), with particular reference to big events such as
presidential elections, information acquisition based on existing attitudes occurs more frequently
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in the internet age. That is to say, the Internet affords an increase in confirmation bias with
exposure to familiar knowledge rather than exposure to diverse information or opinion
(Knobloch-Westerwick et al., 2015; Knobloch-Westerwick and Kleinman, 2012). So, regardless
of the topic, people exposed themselves to more politically attitude-consistent news more
frequently than not (Knobloch-Westerwick & Johnson, 2014; Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng,
2009). Of course, although there are arguments that partisanship alleviates the effects of media
(Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Young, 2004), the environment of the internet has further accelerated
or reinforced selective exposure to political messages (Kim, 2011).
This feature also can be applied to selective exposure toward inaccurate or unchecked
news such as political fake news (Balmas, 2014). That is to say, users want to read more news
that matches their existing beliefs, knowledge, and attitude (Knobloch-Westerwick et al., 2015;
Knobloch-Westerwick & Kleinman, 2012). Namely, people are more likely to have selective
exposure to fake news that is consistent with their confirmation bias whether the news is fake or
not. As a result, this research assumes that existing partisanship makes it that news users'
selective exposure occurs based on their existing confirmation bias toward attitude-consistent
news messages from fake news.

Credibility
With regard to news, the concept of credibility and its perception is multidimensional
(Bucy, 2003; Cassidy, 2007; Gaziano & McGrath, 1986; Kiousis, 2006;). Chiefly, there are three
types of credibility that have been discussed in previous studies: source credibility, media
credibility, and message credibility (Metzger et al., 2003).
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First, source credibility is the degree of credibility or trustworthiness of the
communicator that sends a message (i.e., “interpersonal, organizational, and mass-mediated
contexts”) (Kiousis, 2006, p. 382). Researchers who studied source credibility in the early stages
of the academic establishment were Hovland and Weiss (1951), who distinguished source
credibility by expertise and trustworthiness. According to their research, expertise deals with the
ability of a communicator to perform the work involved, and trustworthiness notes the possibility
of sharing false information in order to change the attitudes and behaviors of the message
receiver.
Second, message credibility is the degree of credibility of the message itself and its story,
such as the characteristics of fairness, unbiasedness, accuracy, and believability. As mentioned
above, even though there are several dimensions of credibility, the content of a message
significantly contributes to the audience’s judging of a news source’s believability rather than
another credibility such as source credibility (Austin & Dong, 1994). In addition, since fake news
is a matter of whether the content of the story is false information or not, this study investigates
the message credibility of fake news as online news on social media.
Lastly, medium credibility is the degree of credibility in which individuals trust media
sources themselves, such as television, radio, newspaper, and blog (Kiousis, 2006; Newhagen &
Nass, 1989; Sundar & Nass, 2001). In this discussion, Gaziano and McGrath (1986) conducted an
early in-depth study of the concept of credibility, in which they identified credibility as a
perspective of believability. They contributed to identifying what the dimensions of credibility are
and how they are related and to presenting a measuring index in the context of the newspaper and
television.
As the internet has emerged, research on credibility has been extended to online news
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credibility. That is, it has begun to compare the credibility of traditional media such as television,
newspaper, and cable with online news (Abdulla et al., 2002; Cassidy, 2007; Stroud & Lee, 2013).
Recent comparison studies have conducted research on participants’ views on the credibility of
traditional media and new media. Furthermore, similar studies have been conducted regarding the
credibility of online news on blogs and social media (Chung et al., 2012; Kang, 2010; Meyer et
al., 2010).
Notably, the problem is that fake news, which is spreading as online news through social
media, is being accepted as truth by newsreaders (Blamas, 2012). When fake news is consistent
with the existing partisanship such as political interests or political attitude, it is more likely to
affect people’s perception more than news dealing with the truth (Blamas, 2012), and with that
being the case, news users are being exposed to fake news more frequently (Knobloch-Westerwick
& Meng, 2009). However, even though many previous studies have focused on the relationship
between news and partisanship, they have overlooked the message credibility that news users have
about fake news. That is to say, although fake news is easily seen by news users as truth, there are
very few studies that address how credible it is for news users. In other words, the degree of
message credibility for fake news should be treated as one important variable. Therefore, this study
presents the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Participants who read attitude-consistent fake news will report higher
levels of message credibility than those who read fake news that is attitude-inconsistent.

Dual-Process Theories: Elaboration on Fake News and Credibility
According to dual-process theories like the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM: Petty &
Cacioppo, 1984, 1986) and the Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM: Chaiken, 1980, 1987;
Chaiken, & Maheswaran, 1994; Chaiken, & Trope, 1999; Chen, & Chaiken, 1999; Maheswaran,
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& Chaiken, 1991), information processing consists of two paths in the persuasion context: In
ELM, they are the central route and the peripheral route. On the other hand, in HSM, they are
systematic processing and heuristic processing.
Commonly, the central route and systematic processing focus on the message itself,
which requires relatively high cognitive effort. On the contrary, the peripheral route and heuristic
processing, in common, concentrate on external or secondary cues of the message, which
requires relatively low cognitive effort. Of course, there is a remarkable difference between the
two dual-process theories—the two routes in ELM work exclusively (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).
In contrast, the two information processing paths in HSM operate simultaneously in certain
circumstances (Chaiken, 1987).
Also, Chen and Chaiken (1999) focused on the motivation as the cause and condition for
which the two information processing paths are activated. In the case of information that meets
motivation, the degree to which information affects persuasion and judgment through systematic
processing is significant. In consonance with this discussion, the crucial factors that determine
the difference between the systematic process and the heuristic process are motivation and the
ability (or capacity) to process information. For a long time, involvement has been considered as
an essential element among motivational factors (e.g., McGuire, 1966). High involvement refers
to a high degree of personal relevance to the message, whereas low involvement refers to a low
degree of relevance (Petty et al., 1983). Specifically, as the message has relevance to them, their
involvement with the message will increase, leading to the activation of systematic processing
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1984; Petty & Cacciopo, 1986). The higher the involvement the recipient has
with the message, the more influence they will be by the message itself, regardless of the
message source. High involvement leads to systematic information processing. Conversely,
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when the involvement is low, the information processing is influenced by the message source
such as the attractiveness of sender, message length (Ryu & Kim, 2015), consensus opinion, and
a statement from authority or expert (i.e., halo effect) (Reinhard & Sporer, 2010). In this case,
low involvement results in heuristic processing (Chaken, 1980).
The concept of credibility plays a highly important role in risk perception and its
communication, which threatens individuals and their environment (McComas & Trumbo,
2001), like fake news. This is because it deals with whether the content or source of information
is trustworthy (Trumbo & McComas, 2003). Empirical studies that apply the concept of
credibility to dual-process theories have divided the concept of credibility into two parts, such as
message content credibility and source credibility.
First, with respect to message content credibility, as can be seen in the study of the
perception of risk for nuclear accidents at Fukushima by Ryu and Kim (2015), people tend to
focus more on messages through the systematic process than on sources. Reinhard and Sporer
(2010) noted the difference between message content cues and source cues in credibility
judgment. When people make a judgment about credibility, a cue called message content, which
confirms that central route or systemic processing occurs in what they consider to be relatively
high involvement. In other words, when people tried to elaborate on the context of credibility
judgments, the review of the message content is more likely to greater influence the central route
or systematic processing than the peripheral route or heuristic processing from source cues.
Thus, it can be inferred from the preceding that when people perform information processing, the
message credibility of fake news on social media should be a central route or systematic
processing.
Second, regarding source credibility, Petty and Cacioppo (1981, 1984) assert that source
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credibility influences how individuals process a message. Source credibility is powerful in
conditions of low involvement and high distraction. In this circumstance, individuals are likely to
adopt a peripheral route with less motivation and source credibility corresponds to heuristic
processing (Trumbo & McComas, 2003). Previous research about the relations between HSM,
source credibility, and risk perception (McComas & Trumbo, 2001; Trumbo & McComas, 2003)
found that source credibility, which invokes heuristic processing, consistently influences risk
perception and that higher source credibility reduces risk perception. As a follow-up study, they
attempted to combine source credibility with HSM. They explained that in this study (Trumbo &
McComas, 2003), the risk perception varies depending on which organization the source
credibility accompanying heuristic processing originates from.
Above, we discussed selective exposure and confirmation bias that consistent with our
existing attitude based on partisanship. Taking that into account, the current study attempts to
examine what source credibility will do as a moderator under this condition. Tormala and Petty
(2004a, 2004b) conducted an experimental study of resisting persuasive messages, explicitly
exploring the moderation effect of source credibility. In their study, the results show that people
will solidify their initial attitudes when they face a counter attitudinal persuasive message. In the
meantime, the high and low credibility of the source acts as a moderator. In line with the points
above, the present study will shed light on how the source creditability, which is related to
heuristic processing, works as a moderator in situations where one resists or defends oneself
against attitude-inconsistent news, or when one encounters attitude-inconsistent news. This study
tries to clarify what the relationships among partisanship, political attitude consistency, message
credibility, and source credibility are and what effect they will have. Therefore, the current study
suggests the following research questions:
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RQ1: To what extent does source credibility moderate the systematic processing of
message credibility?
RQ2: Both partisan consistency and source credibility can be shown as heuristic cues.
To what extent do they affect the relations between political attitude consistency and
message credibility?

Cognitive Appraisal to Threat as Risk Perception
Cognitive appraisal of a threat is a cognitive evaluation of an environment that can be
emotionally or cognitively harmful to a person’s well-being (Lazarus & Lazarus, 1991). In detail,
Lazarus and Lazarus (1991) defined this as “primary appraisal,” referring to appraisals of
personally significant events. A primary appraisal consists of two components: (a) goal relevance
(“Should I care?”), and (b) goal congruence (“Is this positive or negative?”). Accordingly, in the
context of fake news, cognitive appraisal of threats should conceptualize an appraisal toward
fake news negatively related to oneself and one’s environment.
Since fake news has typical characteristic ways of being sensational and mind-boggling
enough to mislead news users (Haber, 2017), it should be viewed not only as a social and
political threat (Levi, 2017; Tambini, 2017) but also as a threat to individuals (Mele et al., 2017;
Waszak et al., 2018). From a journalistic point of view regarding fake news, while fake news is
more novel than news dealing with facts, false stories in fake news have caused emotional or
cognitive threats such as fear, disgust, and surprise (Vosoughi et al., 2018). Especially important
is that even if the news article's perspective is consistent with one’s existing viewpoint, the topic
can come as a treat because it is already an issue that deals with ’social conflicts.’ Traditionally
and conventionally, in order to grab lots of attention from newsreaders, news is more used to
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dealing with the social conflict issues that are likely to engage everyone, and the ‘topic itself’
from social conflict issues can pose a cognitive threat to the newsreader.
Empirical studies contribute to the effects of the two information processing paths on risk
judgment in HSM (Ryu & Kim, 2015; Trumbo, 1999; Trumbo & McComas, 2003). When the
heuristic path that pays attention to external or secondary cues of a message is processed, the
perception of risk is judged to be smaller than that of systematic processing that requires higher
cognitive effort toward a message itself. In other words, when source credibility is high, the
processing of information is performed through heuristic processing, which makes risk
perception lower (Ryu & Kim 2015; Trumbo & McComas, 2003). In contrast, systematic
processing means a higher concentration on the given message, so it can be deduced that the risk
information is more closely scrutinized and processed, leading to higher risk perception. To put it
differently, high message credibility causes systemic processing, which results in higher risk
perception (Reinhard & Sporer, 2010; Ryu & Kim, 2015). Therefore, this study will test whether
and how the message credibility of fake news and cognitive appraisal to threat are positively
related in intent to share fake news on social media.

Intent to Share Fake News on Social Media
The majority (75%) of online news consumers have news website content shared with
them via email or social media (Purcell et al., 2010). The most popular fake news stories were
more widely shared on Facebook than even the most widespread mainstream news stories during
the 2016 presidential election (Silverman 2016). However, the significant problem is that many
of those who see fake news stories report that they believe fake news (Silverman & Singer-Vine,
2016). That is, people are getting used to believing fake news as true and have no qualms about
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sharing it. This is because, even though two-thirds of internet users have access to and use social
media (Purcell et al., 2010), the characteristics of the internet still tend to provide greater
opportunities for them to obtain information that is associated with their already existing beliefs
while ignoring information that goes against these beliefs (Bimber & Davis, 2003). That is to
say, users seek to increase their exposure to familiar knowledge rather than exposure to diverse
information or opinions (Knobloch-Westerwick & Kleinman, 2012; Knobloch-Westerwick &
Johnson, 2014).
Fundamentally, previous studies of behavioral psychology suggest that people are
naturally inclined to share information (Warneken & Tomasello, 2009). According to the Social
Exchange Theory, sharing information on social media presents an inherent benefit that
convinces individuals that the information they provide is useful (Osatuyi, 2013). Besides, social
media provides an environment that strengthens and boosts sharing (Hermida et al., 2012).
Specifically, the social media environment facilitates users to share by “like,” “retweet,” “share,”
“comment,” and “post” with its functionality.
In summarizing the above discussions, the message credibility is related to central route
or systematic processing and shows high involvement and low distraction despite the message
source. This means that closer scrutiny occurs when individuals process information about a
message. Therefore, if the message credibility is high, it can be inferred that as mentioned in the
Social Exchange Theory, news stories will be shared more with others for a beneficial purpose.
Hypothesis 2 a: High message credibility will increase the intent to share fake news.
Hypothesis 2 b: High message credibility will increase cognitive appraisal of threat.
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Hypothesis 3: High cognitive appraisal of threat, as a mediation effect, will increase
intent to share fake news.

Intent to Share Fake News with Corrective Action
The corrective action hypothesis (Barnidge & Rojas, 2014; Rojas, 2010; Rojas et al.,
2016) postulates that when people perceive that media is biased and influential, it can motivate
people to express their own opinions and engage in interpersonal, political discussion. Therefore,
corrective action happens as “counteraction,” occurring when people seek to correct the wrong
media content that they perceive in the public sphere (Rojas, 2010; Rojas et al., 2016). Such
being that case, it occurs when the position is different from one's position, leading to political
behavior (Barnidge & Rojas, 2014; Rojas, 2010). This has been done through traditional media,
but recently, with the development of new communication technology, corrective action is
actively happening in the online public sphere or public domain through emerging media such as
social media (Rojas, 2010).
Corrective action is closely related to the causes of an existing nonconformity. People are
likely to get rid of the existing nonconformity from a situation, issue, or message (Motschman, &
Moore, 1999; Rojas, 2010) when they identify and recognize these existing problems and finally
“correct” them (Hardoroudi, Dareshuri, Sarkan, & Nourizadeh, 2011). In this process, people are
trying to counterbalance the opposite media effect, positively reacting to their own viewpoints
(Rojas, 2010). Hence, in accordance with the discussion mentioned above, it can be inferred that
corrective action will be increased. This is because the nonconformity from news causing threats
will be increased if the news is inconsistent with pre-existing partisanship.
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Hypothesis 4: Low message credibility will increase intent to share fake news with
corrective action.
Fig. 1.
The proposed research model

Chapter3: Method
This chapter outlines the specific methods and procedures used to examine the proposed
research questions. In other words, the purpose of this chapter is to explore the effect of fake
news on information processing, with measurable variables such as message credibility, source
credibility, cognitive appraisal to threat, intent to share fake news on social media, and corrective
action.

Experimental Design
A 2 (news topic: Immigration vs. Gun control) X 2 (news topic stance: Positive vs.
Negative) X 2 (source: major (i.e., Associated Press) vs. minor (i.e., blog news)) between-subject
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online experiment was conducted. The researcher collected samples through Amazon
Mechanical Turk (Mturk from here on) which is an online survey site for data collection. All
participants recruited through Mturk are randomly assigned to one of eight conditions and asked
to answer whether the news is attitude consistent or attitude inconsistent right after news reading;
participants were asked to read two articles for each condition. For example, a set of two articles
that a participant read consisted of one positive article about immigrants, and one negative article
about gun control. The other set of two articles was composed of that one was a negative article
about immigrants and the other was a positive article about gun control. And then, one story was
sourced to AP and one to a blog. In these two conditions, the order of sources and news stories
were combined to form a total of eight conditions. Participants read the paired articles on the
different topics and sources mentioned above and then answered the following survey questions.

Sample
A total of around 507 participants from an online experimental survey were recruited for
this study. In order to achieve a reliable data set, 507 participants were recruited (above the ages
of 18), who are either American or permanent residents of the United States. The sampling
design was single-stage random sampling. Mturk, which provides an online survey, employs
nonprobability sampling of voluntary participants as a convenience sample.

Data Collection
The present research utilizes an online experimental survey design. The reason that an
online experiment design is employed is due to the fact that it is possible to collect a large
sample in a short space of time with a limited budget. Additionally, the data from an online
survey will be collected at one point in time. The researcher designed the survey in Qualtrics,
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ensuring that the data is collected within the policies of the platform and adhering to data
security and anonymity.
There are several strengths to using an online survey for this study. As Creswell and
Creswell (2017) note, an online survey can help to ensure the anonymity of participants. From
the perspective of data availability, it is both easy and quick to collect data using the online
method. Specifically, both the researcher and the participants are able to access the questionnaire
simply by accessing a certain page and it is easy to design the questionnaire. Nevertheless, there
are drawbacks that must be considered. One of these is the difficulty in conducting stratified
sampling in order to guarantee demographic representation, and the possibility of participants
failing to finish the questionnaire.

Stimuli Development
According to Tandoc Jr et al. (2018), fake news can be classified as the level of facticity
and intention to deceive: Satire, Parody, Propaganda, and Fabrication news. Among them,
fabricated news is a lower level of facticity and a higher level of intention to deceive like “Pope
Francis Endorsed Donald Trump” (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017). Especially, fabricated news
prevails on social media. This is because even though it has no factual basis, it is difficult to be
distinguished since it looks like real news in the formatting and there is no clear evidence
whether the news is false or not. Guided by this discussion, stimuli were created.
The issues of gun control and immigration were selected for the fake news article. This is
because they are specific social issues that have the biggest difference of opinion depending on
partisanship. According to a Gallup analysis (Newport & Dungan, 2017), over the last decade,
the gap between Republicans' and Democrats' attitudes toward particular social issues has been

20
widened. Overall, the Gallup analysis shows that the partisan gap has been consistent through a
variety of issues such as the death penalty, global warming, and abortion over the last 15 to 20
years. However, the partisan gap on issues of immigration and gun control has gradually
expanded to 40% and 43%, respectively, over the last decade from 2003 to 2016. In addition, this
increasingly partisan gap adheres to the traditional perspective of Republicans’ and Democrats’.
In other words, their attitude toward particular social issues seems to be highly correlated, which
means that individuals with negative attitudes about immigrants tend to also have negative
attitudes about gun control.
Therefore, the researcher produced four articles that have opposite viewpoints of
immigration and gun control topics. Since fake news had to accomplish a lower level of facticity
and the high level of intention to deceive, the contents of all the articles were intentionally
fabricated in the context of ‘the 5W1H approach (i.e., Who, When, Where, What, Why, and
How)’ based on a bunch of true news stories. To be more specific, the content fabricated in the
news is a sophisticated mix of facts and truths based on the 5W1H approach: For example, it was
true that President Trump pushed ahead with the construction of the border wall between
Mexico. However, it is false that he and Republicans (who) have endeavored to make a zerotolerance policy (what) for immigrants (how) as migration deterrence (why) at Washington/The
Whitehouse (where) recently (when). In order to achieve journalistic elements such as
formatting, wording&sentence, structures, the researcher hired a professional journalist to review
four different articles. Finally, they were constructed to look like true news articles with
formatting and photography.
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News Message Design
On the issue of immigration and gun control, a total of 4 news stories was made in favor
and opposition, respectively: pros and cons for immigration and gun control. The contents and
photos of the text are different according to each subject. All of the articles were identically
controlled with respect to formatting: The main title was Times New Roman, size 16, bold; the
font of the mid title was Times New Roman, size 14, bold; and the font of the main text was
Arial 12, on average, two pages. Also, every article has one picture.

Source Credibility Design
As mentioned above, a total of 8 news articles were manipulated for source credibility.
The same stories were used in the high and low credibility conditions and the only thing that
changed was the story source. Source credibility was manipulated in two ways: Associated Press
(AP) news for high credibility and blog news for low credibility. In other words, the four
different articles created above were presented as AP news or blog news, respectively. A total of
eight news articles were finally created. The priming for both sources (i.e., AP and blog news)
were applied twice at the beginning of the title and once at the end of the article.
The reason why high/low news source was manipulated into an AP article and blog is
that the AP is expected to be perceived as more credible than a blog. The credibility of blog news
has been gradually increasing recently (Gunter et al., 2009). However, it is still viewed as less
trustworthy than mainstream news sources (e.g., CNN, AP, New York Times), which still have
traditional news brands (Cassidy, 2007). Source credibility may elicit the dual-process
mentioned above.
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Furthermore, AP is relatively rated as unbiased. According to the AllSides Media Bias
Chart (AllSides, 2019), AP, along with the BBC, REUTERS, and Bloomberg, has been 'in the
center' of the political spectrum. AllSides, the internet media outlet providing balanced news,
have rated/distributed the result of media bias around 600 media outlets and their writers in the
context of the political spectrum from left to right. To evaluate media bias, only online versions
of news coverage (i.e., not TV, print, or radio content) were used with multi-partisan and
scientific analysis (AllSides, 2019). For example, CNN is located on the left or lean left. On the
other hand, Fox News is situated on the right or lean right. Thus, it is considered appropriate for
AP to be used as a source with high levels of credibility because it is comparatively free from
political biases, prejudice, and expectations in line with the spreading of online news on social
media.

Procedure
After completing the consent process, participants were then randomly assigned to a set
of the attitude-consistent or attitude-inconsistent conditions. They were given the task of reading
two different topics of fake news articles from different media sources. Also, these two articles
have different stances like positive or negative perspective for social issues. After reading fake
news, they were asked to answer whether news articles are attitude consistent or attitude
inconsistent. The average duration of the experiment was approximately 15 minutes. Participants
were compensated $1.5 for their time and efforts. All stages of this study were approved by the
university’s institutional review board. To help participants better understand the context of the
situation, they were given the following instruction: Firstly, you will read two news articles.
After reading the news article, you will be asked to complete an online questionnaire based on
any thoughts or feelings they have about the article they read. This allows the measurement of
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cognitive information processing the participants invested in the current research model. The
average duration of the experiments is approximately 15 minutes. The participants were
compensated $1.5 each for their time and efforts. In terms of data quality, recent studies (e.g.,
Mason & Suri, 2012) suggest that samples recruited through online sites (to an extent) reliably
represent the U.S. population. According to Chandler and Shapiro (2016), the data collected
from online sites should be based on the following requirements, so as to ensure the quality of
the data: (a) a record of the completion of over 500 tasks, (b) an approval rate greater than or
equal to 95%, and (c) compensation based on a realistic rate ($.10 per minute). In this study, the
researcher adheres to the suggestions so as to ensure the quality of the data.

Survey Instrument
Independent variable
Political Attitude Consistency. The idea for the operational definition of political attitude
consistency toward news articles was adapted from a study of Knobloch-Westerwick and
Kleinman (2012): After reading two different topics of news from different sources, participants
were asked to answer a binary question whether the news article that they read is (a) attitudediscrepant or (b) attitude-consistent.
Dependent variable
Message Credibility. In the current study, credibility is operationalized with two
dimensions: one is message credibility for the dependent variable and the other is source
credibility for the moderating variable. The measures are adapted from previous studies with ten
adjective semantic scales (Arpan, 2009; Bucy, 2003; Cassidy, 2007; Johnson & Kaye, 1998,
2000; Kiousis, 2006) for each message content credibility and source credibility: “credible,”
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“believable,” “fair,” “accurate,” “in-depth,” “newsworthy,” “informative,” “objective,”
“comprehensive,” “trustworthy” (1=Not at all to 7=Extremely). An averaged score (Cronbach’s
alpha = .96) was used to create a Media Credibility variable.
Cognitive Appraisal to Threat. Through investigation of previous research, it has been
ascertained that cognitive appraisal is a process through which a person evaluates whether a
particular encounter is relevant to his or her well-being and their environment (Folkman et al.,
1986). The purpose of this study is to examine how information processing happens with
attitude-discrepant or attitude-consistent fake news between news users. In the case of attitudediscrepant fake news, this would be an appraisal threat that threatens their well-being and
environments. Therefore, for the cognitive appraisal towards fake news, the Stress Appraisal
Measure (SAM) is applied with a seven-point Likert-type scales, (1=strongly disagree to
7=strongly agree) on 28 items – based on a study by Peacock and Wong (1990) (e.g., “Does this
situation create tension in me?”). An averaged score (Cronbach’s alpha = .95) was used across
news stories for the present analyses.
Intent to Share Fake News on Social Media. Participants were asked to indicate how
likely they are to share news on social media platforms in the future by using a seven-point
Likert scale (1=Very Unlikely to to 7=Very Likely to): (a) "I would like to share this news on my
social media." (b) "I would leave any comment to share this news with others on my social
media." (c) "I would post a link of this news to share this news with others on my social media."
(d) "I would leave any comment on the web site of this news to share this news with others on
social media." An averaged score (Cronbach’s alpha = .97) was used across stories for the
present analyses.
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Intent to Share with Corrective Action was adapted from a study of Velasquez and
LaRose (2015). The participant will answer how likely they are to share this news on social
media with corrective action. The five items were adopted with a seven-point Likert-type scale
(1=Very Unlikely to to 7=Very Likely to): (a) "I would leave a negative comment under this kind
of news on social media to correct their arguments." (b) "I would post a link of another news
article to counter this kind of news on my social media." (c) "I would post a link of another news
article with a negative comment to counter this kind of news on my social media." (d) "I would
post a website entry on my social media that introduce counter argument toward this kind of
news." (e) "I would post a social media site of an online-activist group that combats this kind of
news." An averaged score (Cronbach’s alpha = .97) was used across news stories for the present
analyses.
Moderating Variable consists of partisanship and source credibility.
Partisanship. The partisanship questionnaire was revised from the research of KnoblochWesterwick and Kleinman (2012, p.180): a seven-point semantic scales ranged (a) from 1
(liberal), 4 (Independent) to 7 (Conservative); (b) from 1 (Democrat or lean left), 4
(Independent) to 7 (Republican or lean right); (c) from 1 (Strongly Trump disapproval) to 7
(Strongly Trump approval). An averaged score (Cronbach’s alpha = .91) was used across news
stories for the present analyses.
Source Credibility was measured by ten adjective semantic scales with a Likert scale (1 =
Not at all to 7 = Extremely) (Arpan, 2009; Cassidy, 2007; Johnson & Kaye, 1998, 2000; Kiousis,
2006): “credible,” “believable,” “fair,” “accurate,” “in-depth,” “newsworthy,” “informative,”
“objective,” “comprehensive,” “trustworthy” An averaged score (Cronbach’s alpha = .97) was
used across news stories for the present analyses.
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Control Variables. To control potential self-bias of participants in rating the other variables,
covariate variables include personal importance toward issue, existing attitudes toward the
issues, political interests, news use frequency on social media, and need for cognition.
Personal Importance of the Issue. Attitude regarding the importance of an issue that
news covers (Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009, p.436) was measured with a question of
how important the issue is to you personally by using a seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = Not at
all important to 7 = Extremely important).
Existing Attitude towards the Issues. In order to measure the existing attitude toward
immigrants and gun control issues, the participants were asked to answer two questions. “I
believe the amount of immigration into the U.S. should be decreased” and “I believe gun control
in the U.S. should be stricter” from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Political Interest. Fake news stories are not only political also be extremely partisan in
nature (Pennycook et al., 2017). Political interests were operationalized as how closely
individuals followed what’s going on in government and public affairs (Knobloch-Westerwick &
Kleinman, 2012, p.179). This item was proposed with a seven-point Likert-type scale used to
measure responses. The scale ranged from 1 (Not at all closely) to 7 (Very closely).
News Use Frequency of Social Media. Participants reported their news use frequency
(Knobloch-Westerwick & Kleinman, 2012, p. 180) with a seven-point Likert-type scale ranging
from “every day,” “Several times a week,” “Once a week,” “Several times a month,” “Once a
month,” to “Less often as response options.”
Need for Cognition. People who have a high need for cognition (NFC from here on) tend
to process information in a more deliberative way (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). To control NFC, the
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following six items were employed as an NFC index (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo et al.,
1984): (a) “I prefer complex problems to simple problems,” (b) “I enjoy the responsibility of
handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking,” (c) “I would rather do something that
requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities,” (d) “I try to
anticipate and avoid situations where there is a chance I will have to think in-depth about
things,” (e) “I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult and important to one that is
somewhat important but does not require much thought,” (f) “I feel relief rather than satisfaction
after completing a task that required a lot of mental effort” Participants will indicate how well
each of the statements describes themselves on a seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = doesn’t
describe me at all to 7 = describes me very well). An averaged score (Cronbach’s alpha = .77)
was used for the present analyses.

Manipulation check
The researcher tested whether news articles properly assigned participants to the news
topic immigration and gun control conditions. The effect of topic stance (positive vs. negative)
and pre-attitude on the political attitude consistency was tested. For this test, an analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted with 10,000 numbers of bootstrapping. First, in the case
of immigration, topic stance (F = 5.87, p = .016) and pre-attitude (F = 2.43, p = .025) for
political attitude consistency were significantly different including their interaction (F = 6.57, p
< .001). However, for the gun control case, while topic stance (F = .166, p = .684) was not
significant, the pre-attitude (F = 2.16, p = .045) and their interaction (F = 2.53, p = .02) were
significant.
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Data Analysis Strategies
Descriptive statistics, including Pearson correlation coefficient for all study variables,
were computed using SPSS, Version 22 and PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2016). In this study, the
analysis to prove the hypotheses consisted of three parts: (a) analysis of covariance (ANCOVA)
for hypothesis 1. (b) Effect of two moderators (i.e., partisanship and source credibility) based on
Model 2 of SPSS PROCESS macro. (c) Effect of mediation (cognitive appraisal to threat) based
on Model 4 of SPSS PROCESS macro.
Given the two political issues that are the most conflicting in the U.S., this study has
various variables that need to be controlled: gender, age, race, education level, income level,
news use frequency on social media, personal importance attitude toward issue, existing attitude
toward the issues, political interest, news use frequency on social media, and need for cognition.
When it comes to rules of thumb for the test of normality, the acceptable ranges for the
values of skewness and kurtosis are between +/-2 and +/-2, respectively (Hair et al., 2010; Bryne,
2010). Firstly, as the Skewness’s values for the major variables were considered acceptable
(-.736 ≤ S ≤ .352), the distribution was moderately skewed or approximately symmetric. Next,
the values of kurtosis for major variables can be acceptable as well (-1.569 ≤ K ≤ .230).
Nonetheless, since the major variables did not follow normality of distribution (i.e., values of
less than .05 for both test results Kolmogorov-Smirnova and Shapiro-Wilk), bias-corrected
bootstrapped resampling, was performed because the sample size was large enough. The number
of bootstrap samples was 10000. The level of the confidence interval for the observed variables
was 95%. Also, to control multi-collinearity that can happen in the moderation effect, the mean
center for the construction of products was conducted (only for continuous variables).
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Chapter 4: Results

Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the percentages of basic demographic information for each condition. On
average, participants were 51.8% male, their mean age was 35.82 years (SD = 11.54), and 76%
Caucasian. On Average, they had a bachelor's degree and earned $50,000 on a yearly basis.
Partisanship was measured in three ways: (a) Political identification consisted of 36.7%
Democrat or lean left, 15.2% independents, and 48.1% Republican or lean right; (b) Political
ideology was composed of 36.3% liberal, 15.8% independents, and 48% conservative; (c) Trump
Approval rating was comprised of 42.2% disapproval, 11.4% independents, and 46.2% approval.
In the case of immigration news, 333 out of 507 participants answered that they read attitude
consistent news articles. In terms of gun control news, 338 out of 507 participants said that they
read attitude consistent news articles. Not only were all the mean values of source credibility for
AP higher than that of blogs across the conditions, but also their source credibility for source
type (i.e., AP and blog) showed significant difference. Lastly, there were no significant
differences in demographic characteristics across experimental conditions for both source and
news topics.
Table 1
Demographic Characteristics for Condition.

Gender
Male
Female
Other
Prefer not to respond

Total
Averaged
(%)

AP
(%)

Source
Blog
(%)

51.8
47
0.8
0.4

51.9
46.9
0.8
0.4

51.8
47
0.8
.04

Topic
Immigration Gun control
(%)
(%)
51.9
46.9
0.8
0.4

51.8
47
0.8
.04
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Age
18-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
70-79

35.8
34.8
15.7
8.6
3.2
1.9

30.4
34.2
16.2
8.4
3.4
1

30.4
34.2
16.2
8.4
3.4
1

30.4
34.2
16.2
8.4
3.4
1

30.4
34.2
16.2
8.4
3.4
1

76
11.1
5.2
6.3
0.8

76.1
10.8
5.3
6.3
0.8

75.9
11.4
5.1
6.3
0.8

75.9
11.4
5.1
6.3
0.8

76.1
10.8
5.3
6.3
0.8

0.5

0.6

0.4

0.4

0.6

Education
Less than a high school degree
High school
Some college but no degree
Associate degree in college (2-year)
Bachelor's degree in college (4-year)
Master's degree
Doctoral degree
Professional degree (JD, MD)
Other (Please Specify)

0.2
8.7
15.4
9.7
42.6
20.9
0.8
1.6
0.2

0.2
8.7
15.4
9.7
42.6
20.9
0.8
1.6
0.2

0.2
8.7
15.4
9.7
42.6
20.9
0.8
1.6
0.2

0.2
8.7
15.4
9.7
42.6
20.9
0.8
1.6
0.2

0.2
8.7
15.4
9.7
42.6
20.9
0.8
1.6
0.2

Income
Less than $10,000
$10,000 to $19,999
$20,000 to $29,999
$30,000 to $39,999
$40,000 to $49,999
$50,000 to $59,999
$60,000 to $69,999
$70,000 to $79,999
$80,000 to $89,999
$90,000 to $99,999
$100,000 to $149,999
$150,000 or more

2.8
5.9
11.8
12
12.4
16.4
6.9
8.9
3.7
6.7
8.1
4.3

2.8
5.9
11.8
12
12.4
16.4
6.9
8.9
3.7
6.7
8.1
4.3

2.8
5.9
11.8
12
12.4
16.4
6.9
8.9
3.7
6.7
8.1
4.3

2.8
5.9
11.8
12
12.4
16.4
6.9
8.9
3.7
6.7
8.1
4.3

2.8
5.9
11.8
12
12.4
16.4
6.9
8.9
3.7
6.7
8.1
4.3

Race
Caucasian
African American
Hispanic
Asian
American Indian
/ Alaska Native
Other: Middle eastern

Note: N= 507.

In what follows, this study attempted to analyze data in three ways. Data of two news
topics were analyzed at the same time no matter what topic it is, and then the next cases are for
each topic: (a) analysis for both immigration news and gun control news simultaneously, (b)
analysis for immigration news only, and (c) analysis for gun control news only.
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Analysis of both news articles.
Below, Table 2 indicates means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients for
basic demographic information and study variables. After this, the current research will test
hypotheses and research problems in earnest.
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Table 2
Means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients for study variables of both news stories
r
Variable

M (SD)

1

1. Gender (Male)

51.8%

-

35.82 (11.54)

.06

-

76%

-.01

-.17***

-

Bachelor's
degree
$50,000

-.10**

-.11**

.39

-

-.06

-.03

.05

.26***

-

-

-.02

-.04

.07*

.00

-.01

-

7. Partisanship

4.03 (2.01)

-.13***

.09**

.05

.15***

.03

.07*

-

8. Message Credibility

4.76 (1.39)

-.04

-.10**

.06*

.09**

.00

.41***

.18***

-

9. Source Credibility

4.75 (1.45)

-.05

-.09**

.08*

.10**

-.02

.33***

.11***

.80***

-

10. Threat Appraisal

4.15 (1.16)

-.06

-.09**

.14***

.30***

.04

.07*

.35***

.34***

.34***

-

11. Intent to Share

3.37 (2.09)

-.13***

-13***

.10**

.26***

-.02

16***

.37***

.52***

.48***

.67***

2. Age
3. Race (Caucasian)
4. Education
5. Income
6. Attitude Consistency

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

-

12. Share with
3.07 (2.05)
-.14***
-.15***
.13***
.31***
-.04
-.01
.44*** .22*** .25*** .68*** .71***
Corrective Action
Note. N=1014. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. Table includes both results from attitude-consistent and attitude-inconsistent cases toward immigration and gun
control topics.
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First, in order to test Hypothesis 1, an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted.
Basically, the mean value of message credibility for those who read an attitude-consistent article
(M=5.17, SD = 1.18) was higher than the mean value of message credibility for those who read
an attitude-inconsistent article (M=3.97, SD=1.44). In addition, the result of the ANCOVA
showed that they were significantly different (F(1,1001) =180.14, p < .001). Its effect size
(partial eta squared) was .153. Therefore, hypothesis 1 was supported.
Secondly, in order to examine the moderation effect of research question 1 and 2, Model
2 (i.e., the effect of two moderators) of SPSS PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2016) was conducted.
The outcome variable for analysis was message credibility. The predictor variable was political
attitude consistency for fake news. The two moderators evaluated were partisanship and source
credibility. When there is interaction, the moderation effect is significant. (a) The interaction
between political attitude consistency for fake news and partisanship was statistically significant
(b= -.0881, 95% C.I. (-.14, -.04), p = .0011). (b) Interaction between political attitude
consistency for fake news and source credibility was found to be significant (b= .1121, 95% C.I.
(.04, .18), p = .0023). Also, the mean value of source credibility for AP (M=5.05, SD = 1.31) was
higher than that of blog (M=4.45, SD=1.52). Source credibility for source type (i.e., AP and
blog) showed significant difference (F=50.56, p < .001). (c) Both Interactions were significant at
the same time (F(2, 996) = 9.16. p < .001. R2 change = 0.6%). Hence, as moderators, both
partisanship and source credibility significantly affected message credibility. The conditional
effect of political attitude consistency for fake news on message credibility showed
corresponding results. At low moderations (partisanship= -2.6907, source credibility= -1.3543),
both were significant (conditional effect = .5773, 95% C.I. (.39, .77), p < .001). At middle
moderations, (partisanship= .9093, source credibility= .1457), they were significant (conditional

34
effect = .4811, 95% C.I. (.37, .59), p < .001). At high moderations (partisanship= 2.2293, source
credibility= 1.4457), all was significant (conditional effect = .4575, 95% C.I. (.27, .65), p
< .001). These results identify that partisanship as a negative moderator and source credibility as
a positive moderator of the relationship between political attitude consistency for fake news and
message credibility.
Third, to test the mediation effect of hypothesis 2a, 2b, and hypothesis 3, Model 4 (i.e.,
the effect of mediator) of SPSS PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2016) was conducted. The outcome
variable was the intent to share fake news. The predictor variable for the analysis was message
credulity. The mediator variable was the cognitive appraisal to threat: the indirect effect of
message credibility on the intent to share fake news was statistically significant (Effect = .0781,
95% C.I. (.04, .12)). Specifically, (a) Path between message credibility and cognitive appraisal to
threat was significant (b=.1022, F(11, 1000) = 79.84. p < .001. 95% C.I. = (.10, 1.03). R2=
51.75%). (b) Path between cognitive appraisal to threat and intent to share was significant
(b=.7648, t(998)= 14.20 p < .001. 95% C.I. = (.62, .82)). (c) Path between message credibility
and intent to share was significant (b=.4434, t (998)= -7.48 p < .001. 95% C.I. = (-3.60, -2.10)).
Total model of these paths above was significant (F(13, 998) = 113.24. p < .001. R2= 59.62%).
Finally, the total effect between message credibility on the intent to share fake news was
significant (F(12, 999) = 88.27. p < .001. 95% C.I. = (.44, .59). R2= 52.15%). Its effect size
was .52. The direct effect of message credibility on the intent to share fake news was significant
(p < .001. 95% C.I.= (.38, .51)). The effect size was .44. The indirect effect of between message
credibility on the intent to share fake news was significant (95% C.I. = (.04, .11)). Its effect size
was .06. Consequently, the hypothesis 2a, 2b, and 3 were supported.
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For H4 to be supported, the relationship between message credibility and intent to share
with corrective action must be negatively correlated/associated with each other. Regretfully,
since message credibility and intent to share with corrective action were positively correlated,
hypothesis 4 was not supported. In other words, once message credibility was low, intent to share
fake news with corrective action was also low.
Finally, the above discussion of the results can be summarized in the proposed research
design as follows.
Figure 2
The result of the proposed research design for both news analysis

Note: Unstandardized estimates are shown. Bold lines indicate significant results. Control variable: gender, age,
race, income, education, personal importance toward issue, existing attitude toward the issues, political interest,
news use frequency on social media. need for cognition. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Analysis of immigration news articles
Below, Table 3 illustrates means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients for
basic demographic information and study variables. After this, this study will examine
hypotheses and research problems in earnest.
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Table 3
Means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients for study variables of immigration news articles
r
Variable

M (SD)

1

1. Gender (Male)

51.8%

-

35.82 (11.54)

-.00

-

76%

-.06

-.16***

-

Bachelor's
degree
$50,000

-.07

-.11*

.02

-

-.06

-.01

.04

.26**

-

-

-.08

.03

.04

-04

-.02

-

7. Partisanship

4.03 (2.01)

-.13**

.09*

.05

.15**

.03

.17***

-

8. Message Credibility

4.76 (1.39)

-.11*

-.04

.07

.09**

-01

.45***

.26***

-

9. Source Credibility

4.75 (1.45)

-.122**

.02

.13**

.09*

-.02

.35***

.20***

.82***

-

10. Threat Appraisal

4.15 (1.16)

-.05

-09*

.12*

.30***

.03

.08

.38***

.32***

.33***

-

11. Intent to Share

3.37 (2.09)

-.16***

-.09

.08

.27**

-.02

18***

.41***

.51***

.48***

.65***

-

12. Share with
Corrective Action

3.10 (2.05)

-.12**

-.16***

.12**

.33***

-.01

-.02

.40***

.20***

.23***

.68***

.71***

2. Age
3. Race (Caucasian)
4. Education
5. Income
6. Attitude Consistency

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

Note. N=507. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. Table includes both results from attitude-consistent and attitude-inconsistent cases toward immigration and gun
control topics.

12

-
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First, in order to test Hypothesis 1, an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted.
The mean value of message credibility for those who read an attitude-consistent article (M=5.20,
SD = 1.17) was higher than the mean value of message credibility for those who read an attitudeinconsistent article (M=3.82, SD=1.53). Besides, the result of the ANCOVA indicated that they
were significantly different (F(1, 494) = 109.49, p < .001). Its effect size (partial eta squared)
was .181. Therefore, hypothesis 1 was supported.
Secondly, in order to examine the moderation effect of research question 1 and 2, Model
2 (i.e., the effect of two moderators) of SPSS PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2016) was conducted.
The outcome variable for analysis was message credibility. The predictor variable was political
attitude consistency for fake news. The two moderators evaluated were partisanship and source
credibility. When there is interaction, the moderation effect is significant. (a) The interaction
between political attitude consistency for fake news and partisanship was statistically significant
(b= -.1005, 95% C.I. (-.18, -.03), p = .0085). (b) Interaction between political attitude
consistency for fake news and source credibility was found to be significant (b= .1801, 95% C.I.
(.08, .28), p < .001). Also, the mean value of source credibility for AP (M=5.08, SD = 1.33) was
higher than that of blog (M=4.35, SD=1.61). Source credibility for source type (i.e., AP and
blog) showed significant difference (F=22.65, p < .001). (c) Both interactions were significant at
the same time (F(2, 491) = 8.03. p < .001. R2 change = 0.9%). The conditional effect of political
attitude consistency for fake news on message credibility showed corresponding results. At low
moderations (partisanship= -2.6917, source credibility= -1.6205), both were significant
(conditional effect = .5329, 95% C.I. (.27, .80), p < .001). At middle moderations,
(partisanship= .3083, source credibility= .1795), they were significant (conditional effect
= .5556, 95% C.I. (.39, .72), p < .001). At high moderations (partisanship= 2.2150, source
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credibility= 1.4795), all was significant (conditional effect = .5981, 95% C.I. (.33, .87), p
< .001). These results identify that partisanship as a negative moderator and source credibility as
positive moderator of the relationship between political attitude consistency for fake news and
message credibility.
Third, to test the mediation effect of hypothesis 2a, 2b, and hypothesis 3, Model 4 (i.e.,
the effect of mediator) of SPSS PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2016) was conducted. The outcome
variable was the intent to share fake news. The predictor variable for the analysis was message
credulity. The mediator variable was the cognitive appraisal to threat: the indirect effect of
message credibility on the intent to share fake news was statistically significant (Effect = .0224,
95% C.I. (.00, .10)). To be more specific, (a) path between message credibility and cognitive
appraisal to threat was significant (b=.0707, F(11, 494) = 40.13. p = .0131. 95% CI = (.04, .15).
R2= 47.20%). (b) Path between cognitive appraisal to threat and intent to share was significant
(b=.6588, t(493)= 9.23 p < .001. 95% CI = (.56, .83)). (c) Path between message credibility and
intent to share was significant (b=.3980, t(493)= 9.18 p < .001. 95% CI = (.32, .50)). Total model
of these paths above was significant (F(12, 493) = 57.82. p < .001. R2= 58.46%). Finally, the
total effect between message credibility on the intent to share fake news was significant (F(11,
494) = 88.27. p < .001. 95% CI = (.38, .57). R2= 44.46%). Its effect size was .48. The direct
effect of message credibility on the intent to share was fake news significant (p < .001. 95% CI =
(.38, .51)). The effect size was .40. The indirect effect of between message credibility on the
intent to share fake news was significant (95% CI = (.04, .11)). The effect size was .05. As a
consequence, the hypothesis 2a, 2b, and 3 were supported.
For H4 to be supported, the relationship between message credibility and intent to share
with corrective action must be negatively correlated/associated with each other. Unfortunately,
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since message credibility and intent to share with corrective action were positively correlated,
hypothesis 4 was not supported. In other words, once message credibility was low, intent to share
fake news with corrective action was also low.
In the end, the above discussion of the results can be summarized in the proposed
research design as follows.
Figure 3
The result of the proposed research design for immigration news analysis

Note: Unstandardized estimates are shown. Bold lines indicate significant results. Control variable: gender, age,
race, income, education, personal importance toward issue, existing attitude toward the issues, political interest,
news use frequency on social media. need for cognition. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Analysis of gun control news articles
Below, Table 4 depicts means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients for basic
demographic information and study variables. After this, the present study will investigate
hypotheses and research problems in earnest.
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Table 4
Means, Standard Deviations, and correlation coefficients for study variables of gun control news articles.
r
Variable

M (SD)

1

1. Gender (Male)

51.8%

-

35.82 (11.55)

-.00

-

76%

-.06

-.17***

-

Bachelor's
degree
$50,000

-.07

-.11*

.00

-

-.07

-.01

.02

.26***

-

-

-.04

-.11*

.10*

.05

-.01

-

7. Partisanship

4.03 (2.01)

-.13**

.09

.06

.15**

.03

-.04

-

8. Message Credibility

4.80 (1.32)

.03

-.17***

.06

.09*

.01

.37***

.09*

-

9. Source Credibility

4.79 (1.38)

.04

-.21***

.03

.12*

-.01

.30***

.01

.79***

-

10. Threat Appraisal

4.25 (1.13)

-.06

-.10*

.16***

.30***

.07

.06

.31***

.37***

.34***

-

11. Intent to Share

3.37 (2.10)

-.10*

-.17***

.12**

.25**

-.02

13**

.34***

.54***

.47***

.69***

2. Age
3. Race (Caucasian)
4. Education
5. Income
6. Attitude Consistency

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

-

12. Share with
3.03 (2.04)
-.16**
-.13**
.13**
.30***
-.06
-.00
.48*** .24*** .27*** .68*** .72***
Corrective Action
Note. N=507. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. Table includes both results from attitude-consistent and attitude-inconsistent cases toward immigration and gun
control topics.

-
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First, in order to test Hypothesis 1, an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted.
The mean value of message credibility for those who read an attitude-consistent article (M=5.15,
SD = 1.19) was higher than the mean value of message credibility for those who read an attitudeinconsistent article (M=4.12, SD=1.33). Besides, the result of the ANCOVA illustrated that they
were significantly different (F(1, 495) = 63.94, p < .001). Its effect size (partial eta squared)
was .114. Therefore, hypothesis 1 was supported.
Secondly, in order to examine the moderation effect of research questions 1 and 2, Model
2 (i.e., the effect of two moderators) of SPSS PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2016) was conducted.
The outcome variable for analysis was message credibility. The predictor variable was political
attitude consistency for fake news. The two moderators evaluated were partisanship and source
credibility. When there is interaction, the moderation effect is significant: (a) The interaction
between political attitude consistency for fake news and partisanship was statistically significant
(b= -.0830, 95% C.I. (-.16, -.01), p = .0344). (b) Interaction between political attitude
consistency for fake news and source credibility was found to be not significant (b= .0332, 95%
C.I. (-.08, .14), p = .5478). Also, the mean value of source credibility for AP (M=5.03, SD =
1.30) was higher than that of blog (M=4.55, SD=1.41). Source credibility for source type (i.e.,
AP and blog) showed significant difference (F=19.90, p < .001). (c) Both Interactions were not
significant at the same time (F(2, 490) = 8.03. p = .0945. R2 change = 0.34%). The conditional
effect of political attitude consistency for fake news on message credibility showed
corresponding results. At low moderations (partisanship= -2.6897, source credibility= -1.1881),
both were significant (conditional effect = .6281, 95% C.I. (.34, .91), p < .001). At middle
moderations, (partisanship= .3103, source credibility= .1119), they were significant (conditional
effect = .4222, 95% C.I. (.26, .58), p < .001). At high moderations (partisanship= 2.2703, source
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credibility= 1.3119), all was significant (conditional effect = .2994, 95% C.I. (.03, .57), p
= .0327). These results identify that partisanship as a negative moderator and source credibility
as non-moderator of the relationship between political attitude consistency for fake news and
message credibility.
Third, to test the mediation effect of hypothesis 2a, 2b, and hypothesis 3, Model 4 (i.e.,
the effect of mediator) of SPSS PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2016) was conducted. The outcome
variable was the intent to share fake news. The predictor variable for the analysis was message
credulity. The mediator variable was the cognitive appraisal to threat: the indirect effect of
message credibility on the intent to share fake news was statistically significant (Effect = .1559,
95% C.I. (.10, .23)). In detail, (a) Path between message credibility and cognitive appraisal to
threat was significant (b=.1842, F(11, 494) = 33.40. p < .001. 95% CI = (.11, .23). R2 = 42.65%).
(b) Path between cognitive appraisal to threat and intent to share was significant (b=.8460,
t(493)= 12.78. p < .001. 95% CI = (.75, 1.02)). (c) Path between message credibility and intent to
share was significant (b= .4962, t(493)= 10.00 p < .001. 95% CI = (.41, .60)). Total model of
these paths above was significant (F(12, 493) = 62.98. p < .001. R2 = 60.52%). Finally, the total
effect between message credibility on the intent to share fake news was significant (F(11, 494) =
40.54. p < .001. 95% CI = (.54, .76). R2= 47.44%). Its effect size was .65. The direct effect of
message credibility on the intent to share fake news was significant. (p < .001. 95% CI =
(.41, .60)). The effect size is .50. The indirect effect of between message credibility on the intent
to share fake news was significant (95% CI = (.09, .22)). The effect size was .15. Accordingly,
the hypothesis 2a, 2b, and 3 were supported.
For H4 to be supported, the relationship between message credibility and intent to share
with corrective action must be negatively correlated/associated with each other. Regrettably,

43
since message credibility and intent to share with corrective action were positively correlated,
hypothesis 4 was not supported. In other words, once message credibility was low, intent to share
fake news with corrective action was also low.
Lastly, the above discussion of the results can be summarized in the proposed research
design as follows.
Figure 4
The result of the proposed research design for gun control news analysis

Note: Unstandardized estimates are shown. Bold lines indicate significant results. Control variable: gender, age,
race, income, education, personal importance toward issue, existing attitude toward the issues, political interest,
news use frequency on social media. need for cognition. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Chapter 5

Discussion
Given a throwback to The War of the Worlds in the 1930s, the media environment and its
effect has been dramatically changed. It is difficult to apply the current situation because the
media environment and technology have changed so much. We no longer live in the media
environment at that time. Types and platforms of media have exploded and diversified, enabling
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double-checking or cross-checking of news events immediately and actively. Ironically,
however, it has become difficult to tell which is true or false in a flood of information.
Now let's go back to the case of Pizzagate conspiracy theory. We generally don't believe
the news that the Pope is an alien or that the U.S. president is Illuminati. This is because these
stories are too far from the values and materials that the news generally deals with. But if people
consume news that can deftly blend facts and lies together, this may maintain and strengthen
their confirmation bias. In other words, they tend to believe the news that matches their existing
attitudes, beliefs, and experiences is true rather than asking whether the news is true or not. This
is the purpose of fake news, the trigger for fake news to spread on social media, and the reason
for this study.
Discussion of results
As the topics of the fake news, the reason the current study focused on immigration and
gun control topics is that they are the most representative conflicts showing different
involvement with different partisanship. This was demonstrated by hypothesis 1. For both topics,
the results showed that participants reported higher credibility for the news articles consistent
with their political attitude.
In research questions 1 and 2, the moderation effect of partisanship happened in the
articles on the two topics. Partisanship, whether it's consistent with existing political attitude or
whatever the subject is, is activated. Whereas both moderation effects of partisanship and source
credibility were activated in the immigration articles, only partisanship was activated in the gun
control article. Specifically, since the interaction effect of the source credibility was not
significant in the gun control news, the moderation effect did not occur in the gun control news.
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Partisanship was significant in both topics. In particular, negative coefficient values were
observed in all conditions. The lower the value of partisanship, the left/liberal/trump disapproval,
and the higher the value of partisanship, the right/conservative/Trump approval. Therefore, since
the moderation effect of partisanship between political attitude consistency and message
credibility is negatively significant, the higher the left/liberal/Trump disapproval, the higher the
message credibility.
Source credibility was significant in immigration topics. Specifically, positive coefficient
values were observed in all conditions. In other words, in the causal relationship between
political attitude consistency and message credibility, if the credibility of the source increases,
the credibility of the message also increases. The moderation effect of this source credibility was
significant for the immigration topic, but not significant for the gun control topic.
In addition, the higher the level of message credibility in both news, the higher the level
of the cognitive appraisal to threat, which led to the intent to share fake news. In other words,
message credibility and intent to share fake news showed a significant relationship through
cognitive appraisal to threat. In addition, message credibility and intent to share fake news
showed significant results in the direct effect.
Nonetheless, both topics showed that there was not much significant relationship between
message creditability and intent to share fake news with corrective action.

Limitations and future research
First, in this study, the topic of fake news is limited to political issues. This means that
the model of this study may apply to political news, but it couldn’t be applicable for the case of
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the news that is not a political issue. A research model that can be applied to general and
universal fake news will be needed as future studies.
Secondly, all four news articles on the pros and cons of immigration and gun control used
here are all fake. In other words, all of the news articles here are fake news with an artful mixture
of truth and falsehood. The experiments conducted in this study also do not imply a comparison
between the news dealing with the truth and the fake news. Therefore, the comparison with true
news is not solved through this study and it can be further developed through future research.
In the case of source credibility, a moderating effect occurred in the immigration news
article, but not in the gun control article. It may mean that there may be differences in the subject
matter of the news, regardless of other factors. Therefore, it is expected to make a great academic
contribution if there is a meta-analysis on various topics of fake news.
Lastly, by employing the online experimental survey, this study was able to quickly
access a number of samples and easily collect large amounts of data. However, since this online
survey employed non-probability sampling called convenience sampling, it is not possible to
guarantee its validity and reliability compared to probability sampling, such as stratified
sampling. Besides, compared to offline experiments, it is not easy to regulate/control its process,
time, answer, and exposure to the stimulus.

Conclusion
This study demonstrated through an online experiment that readers who read fake news
judged it in the context of dual-process and were willing to share it on social media. In the
process, different judgments were made through the peripheral route or heuristic processing like

47
partisanship and news source. Proceeding from what has been said above, there are a few
remarkable theoretical implications that this study has in general.
As Reinhard and Sporer noted (2010), the result of this study can help how to understand
the credibility judgment processing by applying dual-process theories to the deceptive
communication field. Concretely, this study examined how peripheral routes or heuristic
processing, such as partisanship and source credibility occur in the context of political fake news.
The moderation effect of partisanship between partisanship's political attitude consistency and
message credibility showed negatively significant. This means that the more left/liberal/Trump
disapproval partisanships are, the higher the message creditability. As a result, if a
left/liberal/Trump disapproval participant reads news that matches his existing political
orientation/disposition through the source of the AP, it can be said that the message credibility is
higher than that of the other.
Next, there can be two reasons why the moderating effect of source credibility in gun
control news is not significant. First is thought to be due to the high sensationalism and
importance that the content of the news itself has a social issue. In other words, the issues of gun
control, regardless of whether it stands for a major news agency or blog, may be high motivation
or involvement issues for the U.S. citizens. To judge from dual-process theory, since the topic of
gun control itself is a subject that can activate high involvement or motivation, central route /
systematic processing of messages may have overwhelmed peripheral route/heuristic processing
from source credibility. Put otherwise, when assessing to message credibility, information
processing goes through a central route / systematic process. On the other hand, in the case of the
immigration topic, the moderation effect of source credibility was significant. That is, it confirms
the dual-processing’s theoretical assumption and theoretical implications that show a higher
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motivation, involvement, capacity to process news articles that match their existing political
attitudes.
Given the findings, it is also meaningful that the explanation of how fake news spreads
over social media is further extended based on the dual-process theoretical background. Among
the various explanations for the spread of fake news, this study cited the news reader's cognitive
appraisal to threat as a factor. In other words, the question of 'how much of this news is a threat
to me” can be seen as one of the answers why fake news is shared on social media. As has been
noted in the body of the literature review, high message credibility leads to systemic processing,
which brings about higher risk perception (Reinhard & Sporer, 2010; Ryu & Kim, 2015). In
other words, by reading AP news articles that match their existing political orientation, fake
news readers with high message credibility assess the severity of the threats of news articles they
read through central route/systematic processing. As a result, they feel more serious, so they
have a high intention of sharing this news with others, which in turn leads to the spread of fake
news on social media.
To sum up, the current study provides a clue to how dual processes work under the
context of fake news, and at the same time, extends it to the spread of fake news. Admittedly,
although the influence of news sources varied according to news topics, it was all valid in the
case of partisanship. This expands our understanding of dual-process theory by explaining the
moderating effects of partisanship and perceived source credibility and the ways this can
contribute to the spread of fake news on social media.

49
Appendices

Appendix A: Survey Instrument
Independent variable
Existing Attitude toward the issues
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).
“I believe the amount of immigration into the U.S. should be decreased.”
“I believe gun control in the U.S. should be stricter.”
Dependent variable
Political Attitude Consistency (Knobloch-Westerwick and Kleinman, 2012).
A binary question.
“For me, the news article that I read above is … (a) attitude-discrepant article or (b) attitudeconsistent.”
Message Credibility (Arpan, 2009; Cassidy, 2007; Johnson & Kaye, 1998, 2000; Kiousis, 2006).
A seven-point semantic scales.
“In this section, you will answer about the credibility divided into (1) message content credibility
(credibility for message content itself) and (2) source credibility (credibility for everything
EXCEPT message content itself).”
“How is the message content of this news credible? (not news source)”
(a) Not at all credible Extremely credible

50
(b) Not at all believable Extremely believable
(c) Not at all fair Extremely fair
(d) Not at all accurate Extremely accurate
(e) Not at all in-depth Extremely in-depth
(f) Not at all newsworthy Extremely newsworthy
(g) Not at all informative Extremely informative
(h) Not at all objective Extremely objective
(i) Not at all comprehensive Extremely comprehensive
(j) Not at all trustworthy Extremely trustworthy
Cognitive Appraisal to Fake News: Stress Appraisal Measure scale (Peacock & Wong, 1989).
(1 = Not at all, 7 = Extremely).
(a) Is this a totally hopeless situation?
(b) Does this situation create tension in me?
(c) Is the outcome of this situation uncontrollable by anyone?
(d) Is there someone or some agency I can turn to for help if I need it?
(e) Does this situation make me feel anxious?
(f) Does this situation have important consequences for me?
(g) Is this going to have a positive impact on me?
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(h) How eager am I to tackle this problem?
(i) How much will I be affected by the outcome of this situation?
(j) To what extent can I become a stronger person because of this problem?
(k) Will the outcome of this situation be negative?
(l) Do I have the ability to do well in this situation?
(m) Does this situation have serious implications for me?
(n) Do I have what it takes to do well in this situation?
(o) Is there help available to me for dealing with this problem?
(p) Does this situation tax or exceed my coping resources?
(q) Are there sufficient resources available to help me in dealing with this situation?
(r) Is it beyond anyone’s power to do anything about this situation?
(s) To what extent am I excited thinking about the outcome of this situation?
(t) How threatening is this situation?
(u) Is the problem unresolvable by anyone?
(v) Will I be able to overcome the problem?
(w) Is there anyone who can help me to manage this problem?
(x) To what extent do I perceive this situation as stressful?
(y) Do I have the skills necessary to achieve a successful outcome to this situation?
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(z) To what extent does this event require coping efforts on my part?
(aa) Does this situation have long-term consequences for me?
(bb) Is this going to have a negative impact on me?
Intent to Share Fake News on Social Media
(1=Very Unlikely to to 7=Very Likely to).
(a) "I would like to share this news on my social media."
(b) "I would leave any comment to share this news with others on my social media."
(c) "I would post a link of this news to share this news with others on my social media."
(d) "I would leave any comment on the web site of this news to share this news with
others on social media."
Corrective Action (Velasquez & LaRose, 2015).
(1=Very Unlikely to to 7=Very Likely to).
(a) "I would leave a negative comment under this kind of news on social media to correct
their arguments."
(b) "I would post a link of another news article to counter this kind of news on my social
media."
(c) "I would post a link of another news article with a negative comment to counter this
kind of news on my social media."
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(d) "I would post a website entry on my social media that introduce counter argument
toward this kind of news."
(e) "I would post a social media site of an online-activist group that combats this kind of
news."
Moderating variable
Partisanship (Knobloch-Westerwick and Kleinman, 2012, p. 180).
A seven-point semantic scales.
(a) “Conservative” and “Liberal”
(b) “Democrat,” “Independent,” and “Republican,”
(c) “Strongly Trump disapproval” and “Strongly Trump approval.”
Source Credibility (Arpan, 2009; Cassidy, 2007; Johnson & Kaye, 1998, 2000; Kiousis, 2006).
A seven-point semantic scales.
“In this section, you will answer about the credibility divided into (1) message content credibility
(credibility for message content itself) and (2) source credibility (credibility for everything
EXCEPT message content itself).”
“How is the source of this news credible? (not news message / content)”
(a) Not at all credible Extremely credible
(b) Not at all believable Extremely believable
(c) Not at all fair Extremely fair

54
(d) Not at all accurate Extremely accurate
(e) Not at all in-depth Extremely in-depth
(f) Not at all newsworthy Extremely newsworthy
(g) Not at all informative Extremely informative
(h) Not at all objective Extremely objective
(i) Not at all comprehensive Extremely comprehensive
(j) Not at all trustworthy Extremely trustworthy
Control variables.
Political interest (Knobloch-Westerwick, Johnson, & Kleinman, 2012, p 179).
(1 = Not at all closely, 7 = Very closely).
“How closely you follow what’s going on in government and public affairs?”
Attitude importance for News (Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009, p. 436).
(1 = Not at all important, 4= fairly important, and 7 = Extremely important).
“How important are the issues to you personally?”
News Use Frequency on Social Media (Knobloch-Westerwick & Kleinman, 2012, p. 180). a
seven-point Likert-type scale arranging from (a) “every day,” (b) “Several times a week,” (c)
“Once a week,” (d) “Several times a month,” (e) “Once a month,” (f) “Less often as response
options,” to (g) “Never.”
“How often do you usually read news on social media?”
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Need for Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo et al., 1984).
(1= doesn’t describe me at all, 7 = describes me very well).
(a) “I would prefer complex to simple problems.”
(b) “I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.”
(c) “I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to
challenge my thinking abilities (reverse-coded).”
(d) “I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely chance I will have to think
in depth about something (reverse-coded).”
(e) “I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat
important but does not require much thought.”
(f) “I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental
effort (reverse-coded).”
Demographics
Age
“What is your year of birth?”
________________________________________________________________
Gender
“What is your gender?”
Male
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Female
Other (Please Specify) ________________________________________________
Prefer not to respond
Ethnicity
“Choose one or more races that you consider yourself to be”
White/Caucasian
African American
Hispanic
Asian
American Indian or Alaska Native
Other (Please Specify) ________________________________________________
Education
“What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have
received?”
Less than a high school degree
High school graduate (high school diploma or equivalent including GED)
Some college but no degree
Associate degree in college (2-year)
Bachelor's degree in college (4-year)
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Master's degree
Doctoral degree
Professional degree (JD, MD)
Other (Please Specify) ________________________________________________
Income
“Please select an estimate of your annual household income.”
Less than $10,000
$10,000 to $19,999
$20,000 to $29,999
$30,000 to $39,999
$40,000 to $49,999
$50,000 to $59,999
$60,000 to $69,999
$70,000 to $79,999
$80,000 to $89,999
$90,000 to $99,999
$100,000 to $149,999
$150,000 or more
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Appendix B: Stimulus
1. Pro-immigration AP news

Why do Pro-immigration Policies Make America Better?

WASHINGTON (AP) - Democrats have consistently opposed the harshest immigration
policies of the Trump Administration, from the travel ban to family separation, while
Republicans have largely remained silent. The administration’s latest efforts to punish
immigrants, for instance, is not just cruel, but foolish.

Immigrants make the labor market thrive.
As the U.S. finds itself entangled in a debate over immigration, research indicates there
are plenty of economic benefits of immigration to the American workforce.
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In a policy brief for Trump administration, the three major shifts that the U.S. labor
market will face over the next few decades: an aging workforce, automation, and
alternative staffing — and argued that “increased immigration can provide many
benefits to the U.S. economy.”
A Penn Wharton budget model policy paper had similar findings, indicating that “From
an economic standpoint, the largest positive impact on employment would come from
increasing the net flow of immigrants. The research evidence is pretty clear in showing
that what’s best for the U.S. economy is to have more immigration.”
Millions have gained citizenship and productive lives while the economy has thrived.
Agriculture could not exist without an immigrant workforce, while the list of immigrantdependent industries has grown to include meatpacking, construction, hospitality and
recreational sectors, such as ski resorts and golf courses, some owned by President
Donald J. Trump himself.
Meanwhile, as immigrants provide essential labor, helping businesses profit, the Trump
administration has targeted those in some of the most onerous jobs in order to stir fear
and hate, while exacting nothing from the employers.
Foreign-born workers include surgeons, computer engineers, and financiers, as well as
those working in restaurant kitchens, driving cabs, and doing less desirable jobs at the
lowest wages. But they contribute to the growth of the nation, and if some of them need
help at some point with housing or food stamps, it’s a bargain in the long term. The
economic return makes immigration a great investment for the nation. This is why
Trump’s public charge rule is bad for all Americans, not just those who strive to become
one.

Increasing the inflow of immigrants means a bigger market.
U.S. Census data and the Penn Wharton paper support the notion that immigration
leads to a bigger market. They highlighted how increasing legal immigration can have a
major positive impact on GDP, stating that 2.1 million more legal immigrants over the
next 40 years would put the average annual GDP growth at 3%.
Notably, Havard Business Review describes, “Immigration is not just an increase in the
supply of workers. It’s also an increase in the supply of consumers. Increasing the
inflow of immigrants means a bigger consumer market, growing demand for housing
and food. And not only do more people increase the demand for existing products, but
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they also create new markets because immigrants bring new tastes and needs and mix
those tastes and needs with local people.”

In fact, Trump administration will expand on helping Immigrants
Despite anti-immigrant rhetoric and tighter enforcement of immigration laws aimed at
slowing legal immigration, the Trump administration is giving up to $20 million to help
permanent residents become American citizens. This will increase further over the next
five years.
Under the Trump administration, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
announced it is accepting applications for grants for citizenship preparation programs in
communities across the country.
Currently, USCIS publishes study guide materials for the civics portion of the test, which
encompasses 100 questions and answers, and for the language section. There are
plenty of other free online resources. Immigrants can also watch a video about the
interview and test process.
Furthermore, according to a senior administration official, Trump administration has
been discussing an executive order to shrink and partially eliminate borderline walls in
the long term.

--Contact AP’s global investigative team at Investigative@ap.org
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2. Anti-immigration AP news

President Trump Allowed a Stronger Immigration Deterrence Policy
and a Wider Range of Borderline Walls

President Trump tweet is saying
“This is an invasion of our Country and our Military is waiting for you!”
WASHINGTON (AP) - A bigger border-funding bill ultimately passed in the House, as
expected. President Donald J. Trump has spent his entire presidency building upon the
anti-immigration movement.“to take people out and take them back to their countries.” It
is argued that higher and wider barriers and stricter policies are needed.
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Trump has said the country was already “full,” and “Newcomers compete for jobs
against the most vulnerable Americans and put pressure on our social safety net and
generous welfare programs.”
For instance, illegal immigrants annually cost New York taxpayers an estimated $2
billion for welfare, education and other costs, he said — a price that will only rise as the
illegal immigrant population goes up. “They’re a net fiscal drain because they don’t pay
enough in taxes to cover the cost of the social services they use,” Trump said. “So the
more illegal immigrants, the higher costs to taxpayers. It’s just common sense.”

A zero-tolerance policy for immigrants makes the U.S. better.
The decision is based on long-term plans and actions. The Trump administration and
Republican officials have endeavored to support and implement the administration's
“extended borderline wall” and "zero-tolerance" policy.
The anti-immigrant movement has increasingly gained influence over the past decade,
reaching a high point during the Trump administration. Top administrative positions in
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have been filled by conservatives from the
right-wing who favor building and enforcing the border wall.
The new wave of anti-immigration leading the DHS is responsible for overseeing the
nation’s entire immigration system, from adjudicating visa petitions and applications for
citizenship and asylum to handling arrests and deportations. These policies have also
played a role in, or defended, policies that outrage many Americans, such as increased
use of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) exercises.
Next step, Trump will further expand and strengthen DNA testing, as well as tightening
and calling for stricter procedures for issuing green cards as well as any existing visas.

--Contact AP’s global investigative team at Investigative@ap.org
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3. Pro-Gun control AP news

After Tragic Mass Shootings, Democrats Begin New Legislation
in a Call for Tougher Gun Laws

WASHINGTON (AP) - Gun safety has rocketed to the top of the agenda for
Washington’s lawmakers after a string of mass shootings.
Congress heads back to work in the wake of yet another mass shooting. Democrats are
preparing legislation that will reinforce and expand background checks on people
buying guns. It is also expected to include legislation that can apply the existing red-flag
law more comprehensively, that is, much broader coverage of ownership and portability
restrictions. The long-term plan of extending the law to limit the sale of firearms to the
private sector appears to be under discussion.
House Democrats pushed forward a new package of gun restrictions, including a bill
that would ban the manufacture and sale of large-capacity magazines, and sharpened
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their calls to take up a bill the House approved in February expanding background
checks to all gun buyers.
There have been lengthy discussions between the White House and various Senators
about potential gun control legislation since the series of tragedies.
The Senate majority leader has also allowed a vote on gun control legislation that was
passed by the Democratic-controlled House. The bill would require universal
background checks for almost firearm purchases.
The point is to see a reduction in all shootings. No one believes that all gun deaths will
be prevented, just drastically reduced. And that argument actually reinforces a need to
aggressively fund studies to figure out which measures would work best.
However, President Donald J. Trump made it clear that the mass shooting hadn’t
changed his thinking on guns. Trump does not agree that The National Rifle Association
(NRA) itself is a consequence of American gun culture. If the NRA disappeared
tomorrow, American gun owners would spontaneously self-organize in defense of their
rights.
The gap between Trump’s promises and actions is unfortunate because the vast
majority of mass shootings take place in so-called gun-free zones. As studies of activeshooter incidents show beyond doubt, killing spree almost always ends when the people
starting shooting back at the criminals. If law enforcement or security guards are
present, that’s good for prevention. But the police cannot be everywhere at once, and
the time that it takes for the police to arrive is the criminals’ window for murder.
Opposition to the Trump administration's policy, Democrats in the Senate and House of
Representatives, are in agreement with legislative procedures for stricter gun control,
and their voices are becoming stronger.
One possible action is for states to extend so-called red flag laws. Such laws permit
police or family members to petition a state court to order the temporary removal of
firearms from a person who may present a danger to themselves or others. The court
order also may prevent a person from purchasing guns. Seventeen states, including
California and the District of Columbia, have adopted red flag laws. California adopted
its law after a gunman killed six people and wounded 14 others in 2014 near the
campus of the UC Santa Barbara.
Although it is unclear whether red flag laws prevent mass shootings, a number of
studies have shown that they are successful in decreasing suicides. Taking guns away
from those a court finds to be potentially dangerous is undoubtedly desirable.
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Red-flag laws could stop mass shootings at least occasionally, but unless the laws have
very strong due-process protections (which the bills being pushed by the gun-control
lobbies do not), these laws are easy to abuse.
Centralizing registration will be a future demand of the gun-prohibition lobby if Trump
surrenders to the current demands. “Universal background check” laws are
unenforceable without gun registration. Retail gun sales are already registered via
record-keeping by the retailer. When a dealer retires, all of his registration records must
be delivered to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, where they
are digitized.

--Contact AP’s global investigative team at Investigative@ap.org
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4. Anti-Gun control AP news

After Mass Shootings, Republicans Are Convinced the Existing
System is Still Correct

WASHINGTON (AP) - President Donald J. Trump argues that current systems and laws
are sufficient to build a social safety net, saying it is more of a mental health issue and
that the U.S. already had sufficient background checks in place.
A large chunk of people still opposes any new gun control laws. They claim the only
thing that will stop a bad man with a gun is armed guards to prevent all mass shootings.
Any new legislation is a slippery slope for an aggressive agenda to massively restrict
guns.
House Republicans suggested that Republicans were more interested in making the
existing background check system “work better” than they were in expanding it.

67

Polls from Chicago University and a Fox News/Washington Post partnership asked
about the gun control debate in America and specific gun control proposals. Both polls
showed a general downward trend in support for new gun control measures even in the
immediate aftermath of mass shootings in Texas and Ohio.
In addition, the Trump administration does not seem to be compelling or making much
progress on this issue, which is sensitive to public opinion, ahead of the 2020 election
and impeachment trial. Trump imagines that he will win reelection because the other
party’s nominee will be too extreme. Trump has been sending mixed signals on whether
he would support strong gun control legislation.

--Contact AP’s global investigative team at Investigative@ap.org
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5. Pro-immigration Blog news

Why do Pro-immigration Policies Make America Better?

Democrats have consistently opposed the harshest immigration policies of the Trump
Administration, from the travel ban to family separation, while Republicans have largely
remained silent. The administration’s latest efforts to punish immigrants, for instance, is
not just cruel, but foolish.
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Immigrants make the labor market thrive.
As the U.S. finds itself entangled in a debate over immigration, research indicates there
are plenty of economic benefits of immigration to the American workforce.
In a policy brief for Trump administration, the three major shifts that the U.S. labor
market will face over the next few decades: an aging workforce, automation, and
alternative staffing — and argued that “increased immigration can provide many
benefits to the U.S. economy.”
A Penn Wharton budget model policy paper had similar findings, indicating that “From
an economic standpoint, the largest positive impact on employment would come from
increasing the net flow of immigrants. The research evidence is pretty clear in showing
that what’s best for the U.S. economy is to have more immigration.”
Millions have gained citizenship and productive lives while the economy has thrived.
Agriculture could not exist without an immigrant workforce, while the list of immigrantdependent industries has grown to include meatpacking, construction, hospitality and
recreational sectors, such as ski resorts and golf courses, some owned by President
Donald J. Trump himself.
Meanwhile, as immigrants provide essential labor, helping businesses profit, the Trump
administration has targeted those in some of the most onerous jobs in order to stir fear
and hate, while exacting nothing from the employers.
Foreign-born workers include surgeons, computer engineers, and financiers, as well as
those working in restaurant kitchens, driving cabs, and doing less desirable jobs at the
lowest wages. But they contribute to the growth of the nation, and if some of them need
help at some point with housing or food stamps, it’s a bargain in the long term. The
economic return makes immigration a great investment for the nation. This is why
Trump’s public charge rule is bad for all Americans, not just those who strive to become
one.

Increasing the inflow of immigrants means a bigger market.
U.S. Census data and the Penn Wharton paper support the notion that immigration
leads to a bigger market. They highlighted how increasing legal immigration can have a
major positive impact on GDP, stating that 2.1 million more legal immigrants over the
next 40 years would put the average annual GDP growth at 3%.
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Notably, Havard Business Review describes, “Immigration is not just an increase in the
supply of workers. It’s also an increase in the supply of consumers. Increasing the
inflow of immigrants means a bigger consumer market, growing demand for housing
and food. And not only do more people increase the demand for existing products, but
they also create new markets because immigrants bring new tastes and needs and mix
those tastes and needs with local people.”

In fact, Trump administration will expand on helping Immigrants
Despite anti-immigrant rhetoric and tighter enforcement of immigration laws aimed at
slowing legal immigration, Trump administration is giving up to $20 million to help
permanent residents become American citizens. This will increase further over the next
five years.
Under the Trump administration, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
announced it is accepting applications for grants for citizenship preparation programs in
communities across the country.
Currently, USCIS publishes study guide materials for the civics portion of the test, which
encompasses 100 questions and answers, and for the language section. There are
plenty of other free online resources. Immigrants can also watch a video about the
interview and test process.
Furthermore, according to a senior administration official, Trump administration has
been discussing an executive order to shrink and partially eliminate borderline walls in
the long term.
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6. Anti-immigration Blog news

President Trump Allowed a Stronger Immigration
Deterrence Policy and a Wider Range of Borderline Walls

President Trump tweet is saying
“This is an invasion of our Country and our Military is waiting for you!”
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A bigger border-funding bill ultimately passed in the House, as expected. President
Donald J. Trump has spent his entire presidency building upon the anti-immigration
movement.“to take people out and take them back to their countries.” It is argued that
higher and wider barriers and stricter policies are needed.
Trump has said the country was already “full,” and “Newcomers compete for jobs
against the most vulnerable Americans and put pressure on our social safety net and
generous welfare programs.”
For instance, illegal immigrants annually cost New York taxpayers an estimated $2
billion for welfare, education and other costs, he said — a price that will only rise as the
illegal immigrant population goes up. “They’re a net fiscal drain because they don’t pay
enough in taxes to cover the cost of the social services they use,” Trump said. “So the
more illegal immigrants, the higher costs to taxpayers. It’s just common sense.”

A zero-tolerance policy for immigrants makes the U.S. better.
The decision is based on long-term plans and actions. The Trump administration and
Republican officials have endeavored to support and implement the administration's
“extended borderline wall” and "zero-tolerance" policy.
The anti-immigrant movement has increasingly gained influence over the past decade,
reaching a high point during the Trump administration. Top administrative positions in
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have been filled by conservatives from the
right-wing who favor building and enforcing the border wall.
The new wave of anti-immigration leading the DHS is responsible for overseeing the
nation’s entire immigration system, from adjudicating visa petitions and applications for
citizenship and asylum to handling arrests and deportations. These policies have also
played a role in, or defended, policies that outrage many Americans, such as increased
use of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) exercises.
Next step, Trump will further expand and strengthen DNA testing, as well as tightening
and calling for stricter procedures for issuing green cards as well as any existing visas.
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7. Pro-Gun control Blog news

After Tragic Mass Shootings, Democrats Begin New
Legislation in a Call for Tougher Gun Laws

Gun safety has rocketed to the top of the agenda for Washington’s lawmakers after a
string of mass shootings.
Congress heads back to work in the wake of yet another mass shooting. Democrats are
preparing legislation that will reinforce and expand background checks on people
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buying guns. It is also expected to include legislation that can apply the existing red-flag
law more comprehensively, that is, much broader coverage of ownership and portability
restrictions. The long-term plan of extending the law to limit the sale of firearms to the
private sector appears to be under discussion.
House Democrats pushed forward a new package of gun restrictions, including a bill
that would ban the manufacture and sale of large-capacity magazines, and sharpened
their calls to take up a bill the House approved in February expanding background
checks to all gun buyers.
There have been lengthy discussions between the White House and various Senators
about potential gun control legislation since the series of tragedies.
The Senate majority leader has also allowed a vote on gun control legislation that was
passed by the Democratic-controlled House. The bill would require universal
background checks for almost firearm purchases.
The point is to see a reduction in all shootings. No one believes that all gun deaths will
be prevented, just drastically reduced. And that argument actually reinforces a need to
aggressively fund studies to figure out which measures would work best.
However, President Donald J. Trump made it clear that the mass shooting hadn’t
changed his thinking on guns. Trump does not agree that The National Rifle Association
(NRA) itself is a consequence of American gun culture. If the NRA disappeared
tomorrow, American gun owners would spontaneously self-organize in defense of their
rights.
The gap between Trump’s promises and actions is unfortunate because the vast
majority of mass shootings take place in so-called gun-free zones. As studies of activeshooter incidents show beyond doubt, killing spree almost always ends when the people
starting shooting back at the criminals. If law enforcement or security guards are
present, that’s good for prevention. But the police cannot be everywhere at once, and
the time that it takes for the police to arrive is the criminals’ window for murder.
Opposition to the Trump administration's policy, Democrats in the Senate and House of
Representatives, are in agreement with legislative procedures for stricter gun control,
and their voices are becoming stronger.
One possible action is for states to extend so-called red flag laws. Such laws permit
police or family members to petition a state court to order the temporary removal of
firearms from a person who may present a danger to themselves or others. The court
order also may prevent a person from purchasing guns. Seventeen states, including
California and the District of Columbia, have adopted red flag laws. California adopted
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its law after a gunman killed six people and wounded 14 others in 2014 near the
campus of the UC Santa Barbara.
Although it is unclear whether red flag laws prevent mass shootings, a number of
studies have shown that they are successful in decreasing suicides. Taking guns away
from those a court finds to be potentially dangerous is undoubtedly desirable.
Red-flag laws could stop mass shootings at least occasionally, but unless the laws have
very strong due-process protections (which the bills being pushed by the gun-control
lobbies do not), these laws are easy to abuse.
Centralizing registration will be a future demand of the gun-prohibition lobby if Trump
surrenders to the current demands. “Universal background check” laws are
unenforceable without gun registration. Retail gun sales are already registered via
record-keeping by the retailer. When a dealer retires, all of his registration records must
be delivered to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, where they
are digitized.
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8. Anti-Gun control Blog news

After Mass Shootings, Republicans Are Convinced the
Existing System is Still Correct

President Donald J. Trump argues that current systems and laws are sufficient to build
a social safety net, saying it is more of a mental health issue and that the U.S. already
had sufficient background checks in place.
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A large chunk of people still opposes any new gun control laws. They claim the only
thing that will stop a bad man with a gun is armed guards to prevent all mass shootings.
Any new legislation is a slippery slope for an aggressive agenda to massively restrict
guns.
House Republicans suggested that Republicans were more interested in making the
existing background check system “work better” than they were in expanding it.
Polls from Chicago University and a Fox News/Washington Post partnership asked
about the gun control debate in America and specific gun control proposals. Both polls
showed a general downward trend in support for new gun control measures even in the
immediate aftermath of mass shootings in Texas and Ohio.
In addition, the Trump administration does not seem to be compelling or making much
progress on this issue, which is sensitive to public opinion, ahead of the 2020 election
and impeachment trial. Trump imagines that he will win reelection because the other
party’s nominee will be too extreme. Trump has been sending mixed signals on whether
he would support strong gun control legislation.
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Appendix C: advisor and committee members
Advisor: Dr. Tamara Makana Chock.
Committee members: Dr. Dennis Kinsey, Dr. Greg Munno
Oral Chair: Dr. Bong Gee Jang
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